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Estimating cognitive or affective state from neurophysiological signals and designing
applications that make use of this information requires expertise in many disciplines such
as neurophysiology, machine learning, experimental psychology, and human factors.
This makes it difficult to perform research that is strong in all its aspects as well
as to judge a study or application on its merits. On the occasion of the special
topic “Using neurophysiological signals that reflect cognitive or affective state” we here
summarize often occurring pitfalls and recommendations on how to avoid them, both
for authors (researchers) and readers. They relate to defining the state of interest, the
neurophysiological processes that are expected to be involved in the state of interest,
confounding factors, inadvertently “cheating” with classification analyses, insight on what
underlies successful state estimation, and finally, the added value of neurophysiological
measures in the context of an application. We hope that this paper will support the
community in producing high quality studies and well-validated, useful applications.
Keywords: passive BCI, physiological computing, mental state estimation, affective computing, neuroergonomics,
EEG, applied neuroscience
Introduction
A Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) has commonly been defined as a communication system in
which messages or commands that an individual sends are encoded from brain activity as for
example recorded through EEG (Wolpaw et al., 2002). In this view, a BCI is seen as an alterna-
tive communication channel that can supplement or replace common channels such as speech,
typing, or gestures. While using such a BCI requires active involvement of the individual, brain
signals can also be recorded without the need of conscious or effortful communication (the user
remains passive in that respect). This is referred to as passive BCI (Zander et al., 2008; Zander
and Kothe, 2011). A passive BCI represents an output channel above and beyond the more usual
ones that can be used, possibly in combination with other physiological signals, to provide contin-
uous information in real time about an individual’s cognitive or affective state (or “mental state”).
The question of how to detect and use information about mental state is also being approached
from other fields of research. Fields that are related to passive BCI are physiological computing
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(Fairclough, 2009; Fairclough and Gilleade, 2014), affective com-
puting (Picard, 1997), augmented cognition (Schmorrow et al.,
2009), and neuroergonomics (Parasuraman and Rizzo, 2007).
The focus of this paper is on the general area of research as
investigated in all of these interrelated fields.
Several mental states have been shown, or suggested, to be
reflected in neurophysiological signals, and several types of use
have been proposed. Examples include monitoring cognitive
workload through cardiovascular measures for adaptive automa-
tion (Stuiver andMulder, 2014) or using Event-Related Potentials
(ERPs) in response to errors to correct for an erroneous action
(Chavarriaga et al., 2014). While passive BCIs make use of online
neurophysiological responses, neurophysiological responses may
also be used in an oﬄine fashion. Examples of this include using
measures of workload to evaluate different systems (e.g., inter-
face designs) or using measures of stress to evaluate interventions
taken to reduce mental stress (Brouwer et al., 2013b).
Our impression is that generally, there is a strong belief that
mental states can be well-inferred from neurophysiological sig-
nals, and easily harnessed in applications. This belief seems to
be partly based on conclusions that are not always warranted or
on potentially problematic generalizations. While similar prob-
lems play a role in other research fields, there are two specific
aspects of research on neurophysiological signals for mental state
estimation that aggravate these problems.
Firstly, the field is highly interdisciplinary by nature which
makes it very difficult to design, conduct, and evaluate studies
correctly with respect to all their elements. To realize a success-
ful, validated demonstrator of a system using mental state as
estimated from neurophysiological signals, we need expertise in
sensor technology (targeted at easily wearable systems), signal
processing, mathematical modeling, experimental design, psy-
chophysiology, systems design, engineering, and knowledge of
the targeted user group or field. It is an enormous challenge for
scientists to oversee the state of the art in all these areas of exper-
tise, and to integrate it successfully in their research, or accurately
judge the quality of research performed by others.
Secondly, as has been observed in related fields, non-experts
unjustifiably tend to regard neurophysiological data as conveying
an objective truth. Especially recordings from the brain possess
an air of truth or objectivity that is often unfounded (Canli and
Amin, 2002; Farah, 2002), as for instance in the suggestion that
brain activity patterns reveal true emotional involvement, even
if subjective reports indicate otherwise. Weisberg et al. (2008)
asked a group of neuroscience experts and a group of non-experts
to judge explanations of psychological phenomena. Explana-
tions could be good or bad, and could contain no or irrelevant
neuroscience information. They found that non-experts judged
explanations with logically irrelevant neuroscientific information
as more satisfying than explanations without. In particular bad
explanations profited of the addition of irrelevant neuroscien-
tific information indicating that for non-experts, neuroscience
information could mask problems in explanations of psycholog-
ical phenomena. With respect to neuroscience and education,
Howard-Jones (2009) notes that brain-based educational ideas
can be very popular in spite of the fact that their claims are
not backed by scientific evidence. He argues for scientists to not
only communicate skeptically amongst themselves, but also with
the educational community. Researchers in the general field of
applied neurophysiology should take this to heart and take care
that they make a clear distinction between what can be concluded
from their results now and what may eventually be possible.
This is not only important when addressing the layman audience
but also peers who may not be experts on all of the underlying
expertise areas in the field.
Quantification of mental state is, thus, a popular but difficult
art, requiring integration of knowledge across different scientific
fields. Major overarching disciplines are neurophysiology, which
provides knowledge on the functioning of the nervous system
and how this can be measured, and experimental psychology,
which provides methods to discriminate and assess mental
states. Furthermore, one needs advanced classification algo-
rithms developed within the field of machine learning, and, last
but not least, human factors expertise to devise, develop, and test
real-world applications. From our own stumbling over problems
not in our direct areas of expertise, and from discussions with
laymen as well as peers, we gathered that it would be useful to
highlight a number of pitfalls that not only occur relatively often
but that also may lead to unfounded conclusions and claims. An
overview of earlier research, including our own work, resulted in
six such pitfalls as well as six recommendations on how to avoid
them. They are discussed below and may serve to improve the
design and execution of a study as well as a checklist to keep in
mind when reading and evaluating studies. A summary is pro-
vided in Table 1. An interesting, but not wholly surprising find-
ing is that most of the pitfalls occur in interdisciplinary regions
linking the four scientific fields mentioned above. This is illus-
trated in Figure 1 that represents 5 out of 6 recommendations
associated with the pitfalls, and how they are linked with the
underlying fields.
We hope that our list of recommendations will be useful for
researchers working on mental state estimation based on neuro-
physiological signals, especially for those entering the field, and
will help to maintain high standards in both fundamental and
applied studies. This paper also highlights the papers published in
the current Frontiers Research Topic “Using neurophysiological
signals that reflect cognitive or affective state.”
Recommendations
Define Your State of Interest and Ground Truth
To prevent confusion it is important to be clear from the out-
set about the mental state that you address. Mental states such
as stress and workload usually have a long history in the (psy-
chological) literature. Not all authors refer to the same concept
when using the same word, which is partly dependent on the dis-
ciplines that researchers are coming from. It should be discussed
how the addressed state has been defined in previous studies and
which definition is adhered to in the study at hand. This may be
guided by the specific application that the authors have in mind.
It could be necessary to narrow down a specific concept (e.g., is
the type of stress under investigation acute or chronic—Dicker-
son and Kemeny, 2004) or to refer to states that may underlie
an overarching concept as is for example done for “engagement”
in Fairclough et al. (2013). It is important to connect the men-
tal state of interest to its operationalization in the study at hand,
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TABLE 1 | Summary of the six recommendations.
Recommendation Key points
1. Define your state of interest and ground truth - Clarify how the state of interest and ground truth are operationalized
- Examine multiple measures for determining ground truth (subjective, behavioral, knowledge of
task or situation)
2. Connect your state of interest to neurophysiology - Formulate hypotheses as to which neurophysiological measures are expected to vary in what
way with the mental state of interest
3. Eliminate confounding factors (or at least, do not ignore them) - Eliminate confounds by design
- Examine post-hoc whether confounding factors occurred
- Post-hoc selection of data to avoid confounds
- Check whether neurophysiological data are more consistent with varying state (as
hypothesized) or with effects of confounds
4. Adhere to good classification practice - Take care that training data and test data are independent over time
- Take care that choices in preprocessing and classification procedures are independent of
validation data
- Use proper statistical analyses to evaluate classification performance
5. Provide insight into the cause of classification success - Present information about the way that neurophysiological processes underlying the different
categories differ besides the classification results
- Examine classification success of different (combinations) of features
6. Provide insight into the added value of using neurophysiology - Explain that, and how, neurophysiological measures for mental state estimation potentially
add value over using other (easier, cheaper) measures alone
- Focus on applications that likely benefit from neurophysiological measures for mental state
estimation
Each recommendation and associated key points is more elaborately described in the corresponding subsections of Section Recommendations.
since this reflects what is being used or considered as the ground
truth.
Obtaining ground truth can be extremely complicated in stud-
ies on mental states. Cognitive and affective states are not always
easily detectable from behavior. This difficulty to observe them
is precisely the reason why neurophysiological variables are of
interest and of potentially added value. However, it also poses a
problem when one wants to relate these “invisible” states to neu-
rophysiology. One straightforward solution is to ask individuals
to subjectively report their state, but this approach seems to con-
flict with the notion that neurophysiological correlates of mental
state are valuable because of the fact that they are insensitive
to (un)intended subjective distortion. This notion is reflected in
the description of neurophysiological correlates of mental state
as “objective measures.” However, it is not necessarily true that
whenever amismatch occurs betweenmental state as experienced
subjectively and as indicated by neurophysiological measures,
the latter is more reliable. Things are particularly fuzzy when it
comes to mental states that are not experienced very clearly by
individuals themselves. Even if you did not feel stressed, when
your neurophysiological stress monitor says you are, it must be
so (and you might even start to realize that actually you do feel
kind of stressed)! Indeed, subjective reports cannot always be
taken at face value, especially when individuals can be expected
to be under pressure to provide a certain kind of answers (e.g.,
social desirability) or when subjective reports refer to experiences
sometime in the past (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). On the other
hand, one could argue that, since affective states are effectively
about the feelings of an individual, they are closer to the ground
truth than neurophysiological correlates. For applications that
claim to estimate mental state, the fuzziness of ground truth
make it difficult to judge their validity on face value. Discrepan-
cies between estimated mental state and subjectively experienced
mental state could be due to errors of the application or due to
the unreliability of introspection.
While determining ground truth of mental state is a difficult
and perhaps unsolvable problem, validation of neurophysiologi-
cal estimates can be performed to some extent by relating them
to several different measures of mental state (Mauss and Robin-
son, 2009). Three broad categories can be distinguished. Firstly,
behavioral measures such as button press accuracy (Mühl et al.,
2014). Secondly, subjectivemeasures such as responses on known
scales for arousal and workload (Mühl et al., 2014) or for dif-
ferent types of emotion (Kashihara, 2014). Thirdly, knowledge
of the condition that individuals are currently in, for example
whether participants are performing a difficult or easy task (Mühl
et al., 2014), whether a certain face stimulus has been paired
with an aversive stimulus before or not (Kashihara, 2014), or
whether individuals will undergo eye laser surgery in a few min-
utes or not in a study about stress (Hogervorst et al., 2013).
Expert judgments can also be taken as, or contribute to, ground
truth, where expert judgments can relate to all or some of the
three categories. Expert judgments are also used in relation to
neurophysiological measures (e.g., visual interpretation of neuro-
physiological measures is used to assess sleep stage: Huang et al.,
2014).
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of five out of the six recommendations in relation to the major underlying fields. Recommendation 3 concerning confounds is
interweaved with all of the fields and all of the other recommendations (see Links between Recommendations).
Connect Your State of Interest to Involved
Neurophysiology
When trying to estimate cognitive or affective state based on
neurophysiological signals, one aims to connect a certain psycho-
logical state to certain physiological signals. However, it is not a
priori clear how, or to what extent, states defined from a psycho-
logical point of view map onto neurophysiology. Cacioppo and
Tassinary (1990) describe four possible types of relation between
psychological elements and physiological responses: one-to-one
(i.e., one psychological element such as “attention” only maps
to one physiological response, such as heart rate deceleration),
one-to-many (attention alsomaps to skin conductance response),
many-to-one (relaxation and attention map to heart rate deceler-
ation) and many-to-many (attention and relaxation map to heart
rate deceleration and skin conductance response). In her review
on autonomic nervous system activity in emotion, Kreibig (2010)
describes different views on how and to what extent physiologi-
cal signals map onto emotions. While the experience of emotion
goes together with physiological processes, one of the lessons to
be taken from this review is that it is not only the emotion but
also, or perhaps even mostly, the associated (future) action that
defines the physiological response. Physiological processes have
not evolved in order to provide signals that inform us about men-
tal state, but in order to adapt and prepare the body for certain
activity. This may be at the root of a counterintuitive finding that
while (high arousal) fear will generally result in an increase of
heart rate, presenting negatively valenced perceptual stimuli usu-
ally results in a decreasing heart rate (Bradley and Lang, 2000, see
also discussion and results Brouwer et al., 2013c). This has been
explained by the fact that while fearful pictures do not form a
physical threat which would be followed by fight or flight, they do
elicit heightened attentional processing which is associated with
(a static posture and) a decreased heart rate (Lacey and Lacey,
1970; Graham, 1992; Codispoti et al., 2001). In a similar vein,
sadness can be associated with autonomous signals associated
with overt activity or withdrawn behavior resulting in a need to
distinguish between “crying and non-crying sadness” (Kreibig,
2010). Reconceptualization of psychological and physiological
processes may be required to design better models of the rela-
tion between mental states (psychological elements) and physi-
ology (Cacioppo and Tassinary, 1990). Findings as described in
the literature can be used to formulate hypotheses as to which
neurophysiological measures are expected to vary in what way
with the mental state of interest. This will help identify use-
ful variables or features for training a mental state estimation
classification model (see Section Adhere to Good Classification
Practice). In addition, this knowledge can and should be used
to examine whether the mental state estimation model is func-
tioning as expected (see Section Provide Insight into the Cause of
Classification Success).
Eliminate Confounding Factors (or at Least, Do
Not Ignore Them)
When designing a study or evaluating an application, one should
check whether the examined mental states of interest co-vary
with other factors that a priori are not informative of the state
of interest. If these confounding factors affect neurophysiological
variables on their own, their effect can easily be mistaken by an
effect of the state of interest.
A factor that can often potentially explain observed differ-
ences between mental states are differences in body movement.
These body movements can, for instance, consist of button
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presses, turning a steering wheel, eye movements, or movements
related to speech. Body movements can affect neurophysiological
recordings through artifacts caused by subtle movements of the
sensors or wires (Strait and Scheutz, 2014), by “real” effects on the
neurophysiological signals such as electrical potential differences
caused by rotating the eyes being reflected in EEG signals, or by
“real” effects on the neurophysiology itself such as an increased
heart rate or increased activity of themotor cortex when planning
and executing movements.
Another type of confound is related to other mental states or
processes co-varying with the state of interest. For example, when
one aims to increase workload by increasing the number of visual
stimuli, observed differences in EEG may not (only) be caused
by a difference in workload but by the fact that the brain is pro-
cessing more visual information in the one case than in the other
(Brookings et al., 1996). Another often occurring example in this
category is that studies aiming to find neurophysiological mark-
ers of emotions do not keep the arousal levels of the examined
emotions equal, so that reported neurophysiological correlates of
types of emotions may actually reflect levels of arousal (Oliveira
et al., 2011).
Finally, it is important to realize that factors varying with
time can have a huge impact on neurophysiological variables
(e.g., Brouwer et al., 2014; Touryan et al., 2014). This can be a
problem when experimental conditions co-vary with time rela-
tive to the onset of the study. If a difficult condition is presented
before an easy condition, the higher heart rate in the former may
not be related with task difficulty but with not yet being used
to the experimental setting, previous physical activity or other
unknown time related effects. Providing participants with prac-
tice or habituation time before the actual recordings start may
alleviate time related effects.
From the perspective of fundamental science, the best way
to deal with the effects of confounds is by the design of the
study. Different conditions ideally only differ with respect to the
examined state of interest. Different levels of mental state ideally
should be present repeatedly, at different moments in time over
the course of the recording session. However, complete control is
not always possible or desirable. In ambulatory psychophysiolog-
ical studies the aim is to investigate neurophysiological signals in
the context of potential application or in contexts that are more
ecologically valid than studies in the laboratory (Turpin, 1990;
Picard, 1997). This usually conflicts with the attempt to control
for confounds. When confounds cannot be avoided, examining
the data can clarify whether or not found effects of mental state
on neurophysiological variables are likely due to the varyingmen-
tal state of interest or likely due to confounds. For instance, if
the amount and type of body movements (speech, eye-, and hand
movements) as indicated by suitable systems and measures are
the same between conditions, they are an unlikely explanation
for differences between conditions in neurophysiology (Betella
et al., 2014). If there are differences, in some cases one could post-
hoc select samples of data to fulfill this condition. For instance,
when examining the differences between ERPs as elicited by look-
ing at a target object vs. a non-target object in a search task
where people were free to move their eyes, Kamienkowski et al.
(2012) selected eye fixations in such a way that the preceding eye
movement was the same in length and direction for both targets
and non-targets. Hereby they ensured that differences between
target- and non-target ERPs could not be explained by effects
of differences in eye movements. Perhaps most importantly, and
as touched upon before, neurophysiological differences between
the examined states should be examined to check whether they
fit the previously defined expected effects, or whether they hint
at the effect of confounds. For example, when the goal is to
distinguish between processing of stimuli in different auditory
and visual modalities, data should at least show differential brain
activity over the visual and auditory cortex (Putze et al., 2014).
As another example, while one would expect differences in work-
load to be reflected by power changes in the alpha and theta band
(Klimesch, 1999; Fink et al., 2005; Brouwer et al., 2012), differ-
ences in workload reflected by power changes in high EEG fre-
quencies at frontal electrodes are likely caused by a difference in
muscle activation (Whitham et al., 2007). This could mean that
classification can be based on differences in frowning between
low and high workload, rather than on differences in brain sig-
nals. If desirable, it is possible to correct to some extent for the
likely contribution of muscle activation to classification results
by excluding EEG high frequency features from the classification
analysis (Dijksterhuis et al., 2013).
Adhere to Good Classification Practice
Classification analysis is an indispensable tool for estimating
mental state, especially when high dimensional signals such as
EEG signals are concerned. Traditional applied neurophysiology
research typically uses group analyses to study neurophysiolog-
ical correlates of mental state: neurophysiological variables and
signals are averaged over multiple time intervals and individuals,
and using statistical tools such as t-tests or ANOVAs it is deter-
mined whether varying mental state significantly affects neuro-
physiology. While this research and these methods are suitable
to study the relation between mental state and neurophysiology
in general, they would not suffice for a range of applied settings.
If EEG frontal alpha power is significantly lower in high com-
pared to low workload conditions for a group of experimental
participants, we do not know whether this effect would be strong
and consistent enough for estimating workload over a short time
interval for a single individual. However, this is exactly what
would be required if the information is to be used in adaptive
automation. BCIs, that require short samples of brain signals of
single individuals to be reliably translated into an intended action
of a computer, welcomed classification techniques into the realm
of neuroscience. These techniques had been successfully applied
already in fields such as image and speech recognition. Lotte et al.
(2007), van Gerven et al. (2009), Domingos (2012), and Lemm
et al. (2011) provide easily readable reviews on classification. In
short, (supervised) classification models are trained using sam-
ples of neurophysiological data that are labeled according to the
states of interest (e.g., “lowworkload” and “high workload”). Sub-
sequently, these trained models are used to label new, unseen
neurophysiological data. If the label of this unseen data is known,
the label as estimated by the classification algorithm can be com-
pared to the actual label, and performance of the classifier can
be determined. Subsequently, proper statistical analyses should
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be performed to interpret and evaluate classification performance
(see e.g., Mueller-Putz et al., 2008).
While the classification procedure as describedmay seem sim-
ple enough, there is a multitude of options to be chosen and
potential mistakes to be made that may lead to failure of suc-
cessful classification or to overly optimistic results. Lemm et al.
(2011) give a helpful summary of how machine learning is, or
can be, unintentionally abused in brain imaging.
An important potential reason for overly optimistic results
is that data used to train the model is not independent of data
used to test the trained model. This links to the previously dis-
cussed effect of time-related factors (often referred to as non-
stationarities). As an example, consider an experiment in which
the level of workload is alternated in four blocks of 5min. If a
model is trained with 50% of 1-s randomly drawn samples, and
tested using the remaining 50%, the classification success will be
inflated since training and testing data from the same class are
often close in time. Simply because of this fact, they will be simi-
lar rather than being similar because they originate from the same
workload condition.
The number of free parameters that needs to be set when per-
forming classification analysis is very large, varying from the type
of classification algorithm and feature selection procedure, to cri-
teria for outlier rejection and settings of hyper parameters specific
to the exact pre-processing and classification procedures. This
links to another important cause of inflated classification accu-
racy, which is reporting on pre-processing and parameter settings
with the accompanying classification performance that happened
to correspond to the best results. This good performance will
partly be due to chance and not be reproducible. Whether or
not this occurred for a specific study can be difficult to judge
from information that is usually reported in a paper. It is impor-
tant to choose such parameters separately from the test set that
is used in the end to estimate classification performance (nested
cross-validation—Lemm et al., 2011).
The problems as indicated above do not exist for studies that
apply trained classification models in real time as now increas-
ingly becomes the standard in BCI research, since in that case,
making use of time related effects is not possible and classifi-
cation performance is unmistakably associated with previously
determined parameter settings.
Provide Insight into the Cause of Classification
Success
While classification analyses are very useful, they are essentially
black box analyses. Data are used to train a model which subse-
quently turns out to be successful or not in properly classifying
new data, but if it works it is largely unknown what is at the basis
of success. It is therefore important to not only present infor-
mation about classification results but also about the way that
neurophysiological processes underlying the different categories
differ. This provides a check as to whether the data are as expected
or whether a confound could be responsible for classification
success.
Note that results of traditional and classification analyses do
not need to overlap exactly. For example, when a certain neuro-
physiological variable varies both with the mental state of interest
andwith time, a paired t-test can indicate a strong effect ofmental
state while most classification models based on the same infor-
mation are expected to perform badly because of the time effects.
This is because a traditional statistical procedure averages out
general time effects while this is not straightforward for classifi-
cation analyses. This difference between the two types of analyses
is a possible explanation for the counterintuitive finding in an
experiment that varied workload using a task that changed dif-
ficulty level every 2min, for 24 times. While heart rate was a
poor feature in workload classification analysis (Hogervorst et al.,
2014), an ANOVA indicated that heart rate very reliably increased
with mental workload (Brouwer et al., 2014). For these data, a
strong decrease in heart rate over the time course of the experi-
ment was found (Brouwer et al., 2014). This effectivelymeans that
a sample of high heart rate data could originate from the start of
the experiment or from a high workload condition.
Reversely, classification analysis could indicate that certain
features are very informative for estimating mental state, while
this does not seem to be the case when examining results of tradi-
tional analyses. This can be the case when the way that certain
neurophysiological features are associated with mental state is
very different for one individual compared to another, while the
association is very consistent within individuals. This has been
suggested to be the case for EEG signals associated with workload
(Grimes et al., 2008). It may also hold when examining a range of
different neurophysiological responses to complex situations that
allow for different strategies or coping styles. The announcement
of a camera crew arriving in 2min to take an interview about your
research may lead to some kind of stress for virtually all people,
but while one individual will quickly and intensely start thinking
about the messages she wants to convey, the same event will elicit
a pure fright response in the other.
Combining the two types of analyses gives us insight in the
neurophysiological processes underlying cognitive and affective
states. A strong association of a neurophysiological variable with
mental state according to a traditional approach indicates that
there is a reliable association in the same direction across individ-
uals (possibly on top of other factors that play a role but that are
equally strongly present in the different mental states, e.g., time
varying factors). A strong association of a neurophysiological
variable with mental state according to an individually tailored
classification analysis indicates that there is a strong association
in the same direction within that individual, and that the vari-
able is not strongly affected by other factors or occurring events.
Oﬄine classification analyses based on different (combinations
of) features are arguably the most straightforward approach for
finding out exactly which features contribute most (Hogervorst
et al., 2014). Other methods like independent component anal-
ysis (ICA; Makeig et al., 1996) or transforming the classification
backward model into a forward model (Haufe et al., 2014) can
lead to a spatial interpretation of the signal.
Provide Insight into the Added Value of Using
Neurophysiology
Carefully controlled experiments allow us to verify which neu-
rophysiological measures are connected to mental state and in
what way. However, in an applied research field where we want
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 136
Brouwer et al. Mental state measures: pitfalls and recommendations
to use these signals, this is not enough. It should also be pointed
out under which circumstances and in what way these signals
are envisioned to be helpful. This is not always easy since one
should realize that usually, there are alternative ways to retrieve
the desired mental state information. Why would one use neuro-
physiological signals to estimate how well people like a product if
they can also be asked—is there empirical evidence that this will
help to better predict which product they will buy? Why would
one use neurophysiological signals to estimate driver’s workload
if distance to the lines on the road is informative as well? While
the idea of passive BCI is that we have a channel of information
available “for free” since users do not need to spend attention or
conscious effort to convey information about their mental state,
there are costs involved with respect to buying and wearing the
sensor equipment, calibration procedures, etc. Relative to other
sources of information, these costs can (as of yet) be quite high,
especially for brain signals. It should thus be explained that, and
how, they potentially add value. Note that this could also be in the
context of a combination of different types of information. See
for example Huang et al. (2007) who combined ERP and button
press responses for detecting targets within series of rapidly pre-
sented images, and Lin et al. (2014) who combined characteristics
of music with listeners’ EEG to estimate emotion.
Confounds
In real life applications, the discussion on confounds touches
the discussion on alternative sources of information about cog-
nitive and affective state. The confounds that we carefully want
to exclude in experimental situations in order to verify that and
investigate how neurophysiology is connected tomental state, are
abundant in real life and can actually be used if these confounds
are reliably present in both themodel training and the application
data. For instance, if a high workload situation in air traffic con-
trol reliably co-varies with more arm movements because of but-
ton presses, more detailed information presented on the screen,
and more verbal communication compared to a low workload
situation, EEG is expected to co-vary with workload because of
movement artifacts as well as activity in the visual cortex, and
breathing variables are expected to co-vary with workload too.
Thus, EEG and breathing can be used to estimate the workload
situation that the controller is in. This is so because even though
in principle, movement artifacts, visual information processing
and speech are unrelated to workload, they are related for the
specific situation at hand (air traffic control). In such cases, one
should take care to define conclusions or claims properly (i.e.,
such as not to claim that differences in EEG are caused by dif-
ferent brain processes associated with workload where actually,
it is a difference in movement that is responsible for the effect).
Secondly, it should be realized that the trained model will not
generalize to workload situations with other sensory input and
motor output than the examined situation. Finally, an impor-
tant question to answer when confounds are responsible for the
effect is whether it is conceivable that neurophysiological data
will improve mental state estimation over and above estimation
based on measuring the confounding information in an easier
way. For instance, the number of button presses, the information
presented on the screen and amicrophone indicating whether the
air traffic controller is talking could in this case be just as or more
effective to estimate workload than EEG and easier to collect.
Characteristics of Applications That Likely Benefit
from Neurophysiological Measures for Mental State
Estimation
In general, applications using information about mental state as
estimated on the basis of neurophysiology are likely to be of
added value if firstly, alternative measures of mental state are
not available, unreliable or difficult to obtain, and secondly, men-
tal state as estimated by neurophysiological signals is relatively
reliable. Relatively reliable information from neurophysiological
signals is expected when there is little noise due to body move-
ments and when estimates can be based on large amounts of
data. Also, relatively reliable information is expected when the
relation between neurophysiology and the mental state of inter-
est is clear and well-established. Fundamental neurophysiological
studies, even if only based on group effects, indicate which neu-
rophysiological variables reflect which mental state. Emotional
valence and arousal can be indicated by peripheral measures such
as heart rate and skin conductance (Mauss and Robinson, 2009;
Brouwer and Hogervorst, 2014; van der Vijgh et al., 2014). Work-
load has been shown to bemeasurable through EEG (even though
for many studies, effects may be completely or partly caused
by confounds—see Gerjets et al., 2014 for a discussion on this).
Fatigue and behavioral lapses have been shown to relate to EEG
signals (Wang et al., 2014) and variables related to eye blinks
(Schleicher et al., 2008). Errors can be detected by analyzing
event-related potentials occurring after an error on a single-trial
basis (Chavarriaga et al., 2014). In addition, active BCI studies for
which (consciously modifiable) signals with a high signal to noise
ratio are of paramount interest, indicate which mental states can
be measured at the level of a single person at one moment in
time. For instance, motor imagery based active BCIs (Kalcher
et al., 1996; Wolpaw et al., 2002) show that it is relatively easy
to distinguish EEG signals that co-occur with imagining right
hand movement (power decrease or desynchronization in the 8–
13Hz band over the left sensorimotor cortex) from those that
co-occur with left hand movement imagination (power decrease
in the 8–13Hz band over the right sensorimotor cortex). Pineda
et al. (2013) show that a similar principle can be used to distin-
guish sounds that are related to hand-based action from sounds
that are related to mouth-based action. In general, brain activ-
ity in certain brain areas is roughly indexed by power in the
8–13Hz frequency band, where high power indicates functional
cortical inhibition (reviewed by Klimesch, 2012; Horschig et al.,
2014). This inhibition has been proposed to block task-irrelevant
processes, therewith enhancing task-relevant brain processes in
other brain areas. When measured over the visual cortex, this
even allows to estimate spatial direction of visual attention which
may be used in active BCI (Bahramisharif et al., 2010). Another
important class of BCIs is based on the P300 ERP (Farwell and
Donchin, 1988). The P300 is also related to attention—it occurs
after an event that is relevant for and attended by an individual.
The distinction between attended and non-attended stimuli can
be made on a single ERP basis. This is also true for ERPs start-
ing at fixation onset rather than stimulus onset in the context
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of a visual search task, where distinguishing between targets and
non-targets on the basis of fixation-locked ERPs tended to out-
perform distinguishing between targets and non-targets on the
basis of fixation duration (Brouwer et al., 2013a).
Examples of Existing and Promising Applications
A concrete example of an application that fulfills the criteria of no
or unreliable alternative measures of the mental state of interest
and reliable neurophysiological signals, is “concealed informa-
tion detection” (Farwell et al., 2014). In this work ERPs are used
to determine whether or not it is likely that a person under “crim-
inal” investigation possesses certain information. This is done by
examining whether ERP responses to this concealed information
are more similar to responses to known and relevant informa-
tion, or more similar to responses to irrelevant information. In
this case, verbal information about not knowing the concealed
information cannot be taken at face value, i.e., there is no reliable
alternative information present. In addition, data can be collected
such that little noise is present because of bodymovements. Large
amounts of data can be collected and analyzed oﬄine, and the
procedure is based on the established differential effect of rele-
vant and irrelevant stimuli on ERPs. Another promising example
from the current special issue is studied by Wang et al. (2014).
They showed that EEG indicates whether a warning, that indi-
viduals respond to behaviorally, actually alerted them or not as
indicated by a quick vs. late behavioral response later on. In con-
trast to EEG, the behavioral response to the warning did not
reveal an individual’s alertness level, i.e., neurophysiology is likely
to add value. Furthermore, fatigue or alertness has been well-
demonstrated to be associated with neurophysiology, and Wang
et al. propose an application in driving, where little body move-
ment occurs. They also show that similar results were obtained
in an experiment using lightweight, portable, and low density
EEG equipment. Another application area that at least fulfills
some of the requirements is evaluating working with different
interfaces and displays with respect to workload and attention.
For this, performance and subjective measures could be used
as well, but neurophysiological measures could provide more
continuous information, such that potential difficulties could be
pinpointed more exactly. Analysis can be performed oﬄine. In
certain real-life evaluation scenarios, neurophysiology may add
value because social demand characteristics could play a role,
e.g., when individuals are reluctant to report that an ad within
a display caught their attention. Real time prediction of errors
based on neurophysiological correlates of workload or drowsi-
ness could be helpful, especially if people are unable or reluctant
to signal high drowsiness or workload by themselves and if other
behavioral performancemeasures are not available (e.g., for mon-
itoring images from a surveillance camera where relevant events
seldom occur but a single miss could have serious consequences).
A potential application that builds upon well-established motor
imagery BCI as discussed in the previous section, is detecting and
feeding back information on motor imagery to support motor
rehabilitation (Mokienko et al., 2014).
There are applications using or claiming to use neurophysio-
logical signals for estimating mental state that are successful up
to the point of commercial success, while they do not fulfill the
proposed conditions as to the unavailability of reliable alterna-
tive measures of mental state or to the reliability of mental state
as estimated by neurophysiological signals. In these applications,
the (apparent) use of neurophysiological signals is perceived by
the user as fun or helpful in itself. An example of this are the
moveable “Necomimi cats ears” that users can wear on their head.
It is claimed that the device reflects the emotions of the wearer
based on EEG as measured by a single dry electrode on the fore-
head. Also, there is a range of biofeedback and neurofeedback
games commercially available that are said to provide users with
information about their neurophysiological signals so that they
can learn to adapt these, which in turn should lead to improved
health or well-being. While good research is conducted in the
neuro- and biofeedback area (e.g., van Boxtel et al., 2012; see
also Frontiers Research Topic “Learned brain self-regulation for
emotional processing and attentional modulation: from theory to
clinical applications” e.g., Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2014), double-
blind controlled research is scarce (Vollebregt et al., 2014). For
the commercially available self-help applications it is unclear that
these benefit the user over a placebo effect. Even though work in
the area of commercial consumer applications is not up to high
scientific standards yet, it is valuable and important for advancing
knowledge in wearable, low energy equipment, user acceptance,
and usability. However, care must be taken not to mislead users
on what the equipment exactly does and achieves.
Links between Recommendations
While we grouped and presented pitfalls and recommendations
as six separate entities, they are closely interconnected. Most clear
in this respect is the recommendation concerning confounds (3),
that runs through all other recommendations. Confounds should
be recognized when defining ground truth (see recommendation
1). One should consider that classification results may not reflect
differences in mental state but rather result from confounding
factors (4 and 5). Recommendation 2 on connecting the state
of interest to involved neurophysiology could help determine
whether an effect is likely based on a confound or not. Finally, one
should consider to actually make use of confounds, i.e., regard
and use them as sources of information (see recommendation 6).
Another example of interconnections are that experimental skills
as described under recommendations 1 and 3 are important to
derive valid training data for the classification algorithm (4 and
5). Finally we would like to mention that connecting the state of
interest to involved neurophysiology (2) is important to choose
sensible features to train the classifier (4), where good data-driven
classification practice may also lead to improved understand-
ing of the mapping between mental state and neurophysiology
(Lemm et al., 2011) (2).
Concluding Remarks
A large body of previous research shows that in principle, neuro-
physiological variables contain information about mental state.
Continuous knowledge of mental state could potentially be help-
ful in a range of application areas such as gaming, security,
health, and mobility (van Erp et al., 2012). Two areas of research
can be defined that are crucial for future success of applications
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making use of mental state estimation based on neurophysiology.
These are sensor technology and generalization of mental state
estimation across time, tasks, and people.
Advances in wearable, even fashionable sensor technology
boosted the field and are expected to contribute further even
though there are still major challenges to overcome. Currently,
there are a number of dry electrode EEG systems available or
under development. These systems do not require the application
of gel and sometimes come with a fancy headset. While at least
some of these systems approach performance of conventional wet
systems (Zander et al., 2011; Chi et al., 2012), dry electrodes need
pressure to overcome the lack of gel which can be uncomfort-
able. Debener and colleagues follow a different route by focusing
on tiny lightweight electrodes that provide signals that are resis-
tant to body movements such as those caused by walking (De
Vos et al., 2014). For physiological signals besides EEG, wear-
able sensor developments are quick. Breathing and heart rate can
be monitored without attaching sensors but by using a camera
(Wu et al., 2012; Brouwer andHogervorst, 2014) or radar (Lazaro
et al., 2010), andwristbands that record heart rate or skin conduc-
tance are commercially available. Validation of these new types of
equipment by independent parties is required.
For practical applicability, it is important that estimates of
mental state based on neurophysiological signals can be gener-
alized across tasks, time and individuals. The recommendations
as discussed (e.g., the recommendation in Section Provide Insight
into the Cause of Classification Success) are partly connected to
improving generalization and to be able to predict whether, and
under which circumstances, generalization is possible. For some
types of signals and tasks such as the P300 in a P300-BCI, gen-
eralization (in this case, across days or even months) has been
demonstrated not to pose a large problem (McCane et al., 2014).
Wang et al. (2014) discuss that for EEG signals associated with
fatigue, or (upcoming) lapses in performance, findings are simi-
lar across tasks. However, for many passive BCI-like applications
it is difficult to create a training situation that can be used to
train a classification model and that is sufficiently similar to the
application situation. A workload classifier trained using known
labels of a working memory task that varies in difficulty may
not be able to estimate workload in a driving task where prop-
erties of the task and environment are very different. The present
issue features a number of studies that worked on generalization
across tasks. Stikic et al. (2014) show similarities in (unsuper-
vised) neural network results trained and tested on neurophysio-
logical data from combat marksmanship and golf putting tasks.
Gerjets et al. (2014) propose a strategy to deal with cross-task
generalization (see also Walter et al., 2013). The present issue
also includes work on generalization across specific electrode
montages and days (Estepp and Christensen, 2015). Touryan
et al. (2014) modeled time related changes in EEG. Algorithms
that can adapt the classification model on the fly could prevent
problems due to generalization across time (e.g., Millán, 2004;
Kindermans et al., 2012). Casson (2014) shows that adding arti-
ficial noise to EEG data helps to make classification performance
more robust across time. Reuderink (2011) discusses generaliza-
tion issues with respect to variability within and between users,
and potential ways to make classification algorithms more robust
which may help to reduce other generalization problems as well.
We would like to end this paper by stressing the importance
of real-life studies. While laboratory studies designed to reveal
the exact connection between mental state and neurophysiology
are important, in an essentially applied field of research, we also
need to design applications and test whether they have added
value. This should also be done under real life circumstances
rather than (only) in a laboratory. Individuals are expected to
function differently in controlled lab environments and under
ecological, every-day circumstances. For instance, compared to
having images imposed at static eyes, visual information process-
ing seems to be quicker when actively sampling the environment
through eye movements in which case the brain “knows” when
information processing of a new image will start (Kamienkowski
et al., 2012). However, because of confounds in real-life stud-
ies, it will be hard to connect neurophysiological results directly
to cognitive and affective state. Therefore, special care is needed
with statements about cause and effect. Also in real-life studies,
it is possible and desirable to investigate the likely cause of clas-
sification success. This will improve our understanding of the
connection between mental state and neurophysiology as well
as providing clues for alternative (potentially easier measurable)
informative variables. Ultimately, what needs to be shown is that
applications based on mental state estimation through neuro-
physiological signals support users and improve performance or
well-being over and above the use of a sensible comparison appli-
cation. This will likely refer to a certain context and a defined
range of function (Fairclough, 2009). The field of mental state
estimation through neurophysiological signals as a science will
benefit from careful behavior of scientists as to statements of what
is possible and potentially helpful and what not, as well as from
high quality studies that avoid the most common pitfalls.
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